![]() ![]() (Click for larger image.)Ĭlick Paste ( not “Paste and go”, if that’s available) to paste in whatever was copied. Now, right-click on the address bar in your browser. This copies the target - the part you don’t see - to the clipboard. In the resulting pop-up menu, click on “Copy link address”, or the equivalent in your browser or email program. Rather than just hovering over it, right click on the link you’re uncertain of. Copy/PasteĪnother excellent approach to validating a suspicious link is to use copy/paste. If you’re using an email program, like Thunderbird, Microsoft Office’s Outlook, or others, most behave just like web browsers: if you hover the mouse over a suspect link, somewhere it’ll display the true destination of the link - most likely in the status line at the bottom of the email program’s window. If you view your email in a web browser - say by visiting or - everything I’ve described above should work for the links displayed in messages. Email often contains links, and that’s where a lot of these scams happen. This isn’t just about webpages and web browsers. In this case, you can see that my mouse pointer is hovering over the link that says “but Chrome is showing you the URL you’ll really be taken to:. Most browsers show you the target of the link somewhere near the bottom of the window. The target is displayed in the lower left of Chrome’s window. Using Google Chrome, I’ve moved the mouse pointer over the “link, at which point Chrome changes the mouse pointer to a pointing finger. Using the example above: An example of hovering a mouse pointer. All that means is you move the mouse pointer over the link, but don’t click. Hovering your mouse pointer over a questionable link is one way to determine its validity. This is a fundamental component of phishing: making it look like you’re going one place when instead you’re taken somewhere else entirely: usually (though not with our example) with malicious intent, to a site that looks just like the one we expect, except that it’s not. So when you click on that example link that looks like it’ll take you to eBay, it will instead take you to. That looks like a link to eBay, doesn’t it? Here’s how it’s really encoded: The part you see is “ but the target you don’t see is something else entirely … it’s “ “. In HTML, you can see exactly how both parts, seen and unseen, are encoded. To get just a little geeky for a moment, that link is actually encoded in HTML like this: Ask Leo! The part you don’t see is the URL that link takes you to, called the target: “ “. There are two parts: the part you see, and the part you don’t. So let’s go about disrobing those cloaked links.įirst, a little refresher on what a link really is. But the good news is, the most common approaches are the simplest to detect. There are several ways to hide where links go as well. Most shells don't do this, but things like vim do.There are several ways to look at a link (both in email and on webpages) before you click on it to make sure it is what it claims to be. That's obviously a lot more work than just "append the input character to the end of the prompt" □. The client has to be able to ask the terminal to enable mouse reporting, then parse the input for mouse sequences, and reverse-engineer where the prompt is in the viewport, make sure the mouse is in that line, and move their own internal representation of the cursor to that position. It's up to each underlying client application to be able to understand such a message from the terminal. However, the Terminal can only tell a client "The user clicked here". the client is responsible for processing that input and emitting text for the terminal to display.Ĭlient apps can tell the terminal to move the cursor to a specific location.The terminal is responsible for drawing the window and receiving input.Windows Terminal, gnome-terminal, xterm, iTerm2, etc), and the client ( cmd, powershell, bash, vim, tmux, etc). Fundamentally, it's because there's two different applications running. ![]()
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